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Hate Crimes
Should they carry enhanced penalties?
By their own admission, those two staunch
defenders of the First Amendment-Nadine
Strossen, president of the American Civil Liberties
Union, and Village Voice columnist Nat Hentoffrarely disagree on the need for free speech.
Except, perhaps, in the case of Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, now pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court. Mitchell asks whether enhanced penalties
for hate crimes are constitutional.

The ACLU contends that they are, because
the gravamen of Mitchell's crime was action rather
than speech. Mitchell said, 'There's goes a white
boy. Let's get him," before he and some
companions attacked a 14-year-old boy.
Nat Hentoff sees it differently. He believes
that the age, race, ethnicity, gender or sexual
preference of a victim ought not make a difference
in how criminals are punished.

Yes: Discriminatory Crimes
BY NADINE STROSSEN
Th further our constitutional values of equality, the government may
impose harsher punishments upon
crimes whose victims are selected on
the basis of racial and other invidious discrimination.
Opponents of laws authorizing
such enhanced penalties have misleadingly claimed that they create
"hate-speech crimes," and therefore
violate the First Amendment. But
these laws target acts that are more
accurately described as "discriminatory crimes," and thus may be punished consistent with the First Amendment, so long as the laws are narrowly drawn and carefully applied.
If Wisconsin's discriminatory
crime statute-which is currently
before the Supreme Court in the
Mitchell case-punished discriminatory ideas or expressions, the American Civil Liberties Union would oppose that statute. The ACLU has
consistently opposed all laws that
punish "hate speech" and successfully challenged the University of
Wisconsin's hate-speech code on First
Amendment grounds. However, Wisconsin did not punish Todd Mitchell
for his discriminatory beliefs but for
acting on those beliefs by participating in a vicious, near-fatal racist
attack on a 14-year-old boy.
This fundamental distinction between protected thought and punishable conduct is central to both free
speech jurisprudence and anti-discrimination laws. For example, landlords may believe in racial segregation, but they may not act on this
belief by refusing to rent to prospective tenants of a certain race.
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Anti-discrimination laws long
have prohibited discriminatory acts
that would not otherwise be illegalfor example, refusing to hire someonebecause of society's consensus that
such discriminatory acts cause special harms, not only to the immediate
victim but also to the racial or other
societal group to which the victim
belongs, and to our heterogeneous
society more generally. Why, then,
shouldn't the law treat discriminatory criminal acts more severely than
other criminal acts?
Promoting Equality Values
Unlike those who urge that all
discriminatory crime laws are unconstitutional, the ACLU's position
is that, if narrowly drafted and carefully enforced, such laws can avoid
First Amendment pitfalls while promoting constitutionally protected
equality values. Thus, the ACLU
maintains that a defendant's words
are only relevant if the government
carries the heavy burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that they
are directly related to the underlying
crime and probative of his discriminatory intent.
Without this tight nexus, the
defendant's thoughts, associations and
expressions remain constitutionally
protected and inadmissible. Accordingly, the ACLU has opposed certain
discriminatory crime laws in some
contexts. It has opposed Florida's
law providing for an enhanced penalty if the crime "evidences prejudice," because this law on its face
punishes
defendant's
abstract
thought without demanding a clear,
specific connection between the prejudiced thought and a particular crime.

In the Mitchell case, there was a
sufficiently direct nexus between Mitchell's racially inciting statements and
the brutal attacks they provoked to
treat the statements as probative of
his discriminatory intent. Addressing a group of other black men,
Mitchell said, "Do you all feel hyped
up to move on some white people?"
When the victim approached a short
time later, Mitchell said to the group,
"You all want to f--- somebody up?
There goes a white boy; go get him."
He then indicated that the group
should surround the victim. Immediately thereafter, group members ran
toward the boy, surrounded him, and
repeatedly kicked and punched him
into unconsciousness.
Expression may constitute circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent under discriminatory crime
laws, as it does under other antidiscrimination laws. But the First
Amendment does not bar the use of
words to prove criminal intent or
other elements of a crime. An accused kidnapper cannot raise a First
Amendment objection to the introduction of a ransom note into evidence. Nor can a defendant who has
made repeated, harassing telephone
calls claim immunity from prosecution because his instruments of harassment were words.
The First Amendment protects
the right to be a racist, to join racist
organizations, to express racist beliefs-but not the right to engage in
racist attacks This critical distinction may be difficult to draw in
particular situations. But to pretend
it doesn't exist disserves constitutional values of both free speech and
equality.
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No: Equality Among Victims
BY NAT HENTOFF
Todd Mitchell, a black convicted
of aggravated battery in Wisconsin,
was sentenced to two years in prison.
But because the victim was white,
Mitchell, under the state's "hate
crimes" law, received an additional
sentence of two years. (He could have
been put away for three more years
for having said, "There goes a white
boy; go get him.")
"Does this make sense?" asks an
editorial in the Washington Post.
"Wouldn't it have been just as
outrageous if the assailants had
beaten a black boy? Why should one
victim be more precious than the
other in the eyes of the law?"
Yet, as State of Wisconsin v.
Todd Mitchell neared April oral arguments in the Supreme Court, the
American Civil Liberties Union was
supporting the state of Wisconsin.
Whatever happened to its support of
equal protection under the law?
Those also insisting on the constitutionality of extra punishment
for speech-related crimes claim that
thereby a message will be sent to
blacks, women, gays, lesbians, etc.,
that bias crimes must be punished
more harshly because, as Wisconsin
Attorney General James Boyle says,
they are "much more harmful to the
community."
But what message is sent to all
the others in the community who are
attacked for no reason other than the
criminal's lust for money?
Are the injuries they sufferhowever painful physically and psychologically-of less importance to
the community under equal protection of the law?
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Then there is the actual wording of Wisconsin's enhanced-penalty
statute. Due for extra prison time is
whoever "intentionally" selects the
victim "because of the race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin or ancestry of that
person.".
What about age? (We are in the
middle of a cost-benefit generational
war.) What about political orientation? In short, what about R.A.V.
City of St. Paul and the selection of
only certain groups to trigger the
extra years behind bars because of
what they said while committing the
crime?
And what about "intentionally?"
Is all black-on-white crime or maleon-female crime due to bias?
Bringing in the Thought Police
And in countering the defense
against such charges, what is to
prevent the prosecutor from finding
out what books and magazines the
defendant reads, what sort of language he uses at the local bar, and
what his co-workers say about what
they know of his prejudices.
Those, like the ACLU, who are
urging the Supreme Court to add to
sentences because of bias are telling
it to be sure to foreclose such abusive
privacy-bending investigations.
The Supreme Court, however, is
under no obligation to take their
prayers seriously. And if this statute
is-as the ACLU admits in its amicus brief-"easily susceptible to prosecutorial abuse," why is a civil liberties organization asserting its
constitutionality? Because the ACLU
does not want to appear soft on
racism, sexism, etc.

In many of the briefs trying to
justify the legitimacy of creating this
thought crime, the argument is made
that unless the Supreme Court overrules Wisconsin's Supreme Court in
this case, state and federal antidiscrimination laws will be at peril.
Yet, as the Supreme Court of
Ohio, striking down a similar statute, noted in State v. Wynant: "Laws
against discrimination in employment, housing and education do prohibit acts committed with a discriminatory motive," but "it is the act of
discrimination that is targeted, not
the motive."
In disparate impact cases, moreover, no discriminatory motive is
necessary. And under a disparate
treatment analysis, "proof of discriminatory motive can be inferred from
differences in treatment. ... Bigoted
motive by itself is not punished, nor
does proof of motive enhance the
penalty when a discriminatory act is
being punished."
In this case before the Supreme
Court, the act is being justly punished, but the speech purportedly
accompanying the act is also being
punished. At least three state affiliates of the ACLU-Ohio, Florida and
Vermont-have refused to join the
national ACLU's attack on the First
Amendment. They agree with what
ACLU president Nadine Strossen
said in April 1992 in a St. Paul
symposium on hate speech and R.A.V:
"Overly broad hate-speech law
gives the government a very powerful tool that can be-and historically,
consistently has been-used against
the very minority groups that it is
intended to protect." But that was
last year.
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